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This paper discusses how emotions were mobilised by the British tabloid press as discursive 
strategies of persuasion during the public debate on the implementation of Brexit. Using the case 
study of the Sun’s coverage of the alleged UK’s ‘humiliation’ at the Salzburg meeting (2018) during 
the Brexit negotiations, the analysis addresses the questions of how and through which linguistic 
means actors and events were framed discursively in such an article. The findings suggest that The 
Sun elicited emotions of fear, frustration, pride, and freedom to frame Brexit along a long-
established narrative of domination and national heroism. The discourse was also sustained by a 
discursive prosody in keeping with a satirical genre and a populist register that have often 
characterised the British tabloid press. In particular the linguistic analysis has shown how 
antagonistic representations of the UK and the EU were driven by an allegory of ‘incompetent’ 
gangsterism and morally justified resistance. Emotionalisation in the article was thus aimed both at 
ridiculing the EU and at representing it as a criminal organisation. Such framing was instrumental 
in pushing the newspaper agenda as much as in legitimising and institutionalising ‘harder’ forms of 
Brexit with the tabloid’s readership. Approaching journalist discourse at the intersection of affective, 
stylistic, and political dimensions of communication, this paper extends the body of literature on the 
instrumental use of emotive arguments and populist narratives and on the wider historical role of 
tabloid journalism in representing political relations. between the UK and the EU. 
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Статья посвящена роли эмоций в дискурсивных стратегиях убеждения. В ней рассматрива-
ется, как во время публичных дебатов по вопросу Брексита британская таблоидная пресса 
использовала эмоции для продвижения данной идеи. На примере освещения газетой “Sun” 
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«унижения» Великобритании на переговорах по Брекситу в Зальцбурге (2018) исследуется, 
как и с помощью каких языковых средств были дискурсивно оформлены акторы и описыва-
емые события. Полученные данные свидетельствуют о том, что газета “Sun” вызывала  
у читателей эмоции страха и разочарования наряду с чувством гордости и свободы, чтобы 
связать Брексит с давно устоявшимся нарративом доминирования и национального героизма.  
Дискурс также подкреплялся дискурсивной просодией в сочетании с сатирическим жанром 
и популистским регистром, которые часто характеризуют британскую бульварную прессу.  
В частности, лингвистический анализ показал, как антагонистические образы Великобрита-
нии и ЕС подкреплялись аллегорией «некомпетентного» гангстеризма и морально оправдан-
ным сопротивлением. Таким образом, эмоционализация была нацелена как на высмеивание 
ЕС, так и на изображение ЕС как преступной организации, что сыграло важную роль  
в продвижении идеи Брексита среди читателей таблоида, а также легитимации и институци-
онализации его более жестких форм. Рассматривая журналистский дискурс с учетом эмоци-
онального, стилистического и политического аспектов коммуникации, данное исследование 
расширяет представление об использовании эмоциональных аргументов и популистских  
нарративов, а также подчеркивает роль бульварной журналистики в представлении полити-
ческих отношений между Великобританией и ЕС. 
Ключевые слова: Брексит, политическая коммуникация, медиалингвистика, бульварная 
журналистика, эмоциолнализация, критический дискурс-анализ 
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A large body of literature has shown the complex interplay between affective, 
cognitive, pragmatic, and cultural dimensions of communication, and how 
emotional language is part and parcel of every-day mediated representations 
(Mackenzie & Alba-Juez 2019, Foolen 2012, Niemeier & Driven 1997, Martin & 
White 2005, Wierzbicka 1999, van Dijk 2013). Different linguistic/semiotic 
features of discourse can encode specific emotional stances; they can be used to 
convey different aspects of reality and influence how we make sense of events and 
the world. This, in turn, can have significant social and political implications as 
public discourse can be used persuasively to shape attitudes and lead to actions 
(Ponton 2020, Larina, Ponton & Ozyumenko 2020) and since citizens tend to 
participate in political life primarily driven by feelings rather than rationality 
(Wahl-Jorgensen 2019) especially in populist discourses. Although the question of 
representations and the so called ‘media effect’ (i.e., the role of media in instigating, 
influencing, and reinforcing certain worldviews) have been long debated in 
academia (including issues of interpretation and audience reception) the way in 
which actors are represented and in which events are framed by the media – and 
how this is evoked through emotions – has received close examination by linguists 
and social scientists alike. For example, the language of the news has increasingly 
been scrutinised (White 2020, Hameleers et al. 2016, Bell 1996, Bednarek & Caple 
2014, van Dijk 2013) as it often goes beyond reporting facts, with editorial and 
opinion pieces in which journalists’ narratives – underpinned by specific values and 
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schemas shared within a discursive community – co-construct emotions with like-
minded addressees and target audiences so that mediated language can ultimately 
contribute to legitimise collective feelings.  
The analysis of media language in relation to Brexit has produced an abundant 
output in different fields at the intersection of linguistics and political 
communication (e.g., Koller, Kopf & Miglbauer 2019, Buckledee 2019, Maccaferri 
2019, Zappettini & Krzyzanowski 2019, Zappettini 2020, 2021, Bennett 2019, 
Brusenbauch Meislova 2019, Charteris-Black 2019, Musolff 2017, 2019, 
Dancygier 2021, this issue). This paper corroborates and takes forward the existing 
literature by focusing on one case study of how emotions around the alleged 
‘humiliation’ of Britain at the Salzburg meeting (see below) were mobilised in the 
Sun, one of best-selling British tabloids. Although this paper is only able to discuss 
one article given the necessary trade-off between breadth and depth of analysis, my 
point is to show that The Sun’s article is representative of the overall emotional 
coverage of Brexit in a large section of the tabloid press (for a larger discussion see 
Zappettini, forthcoming). More significantly, the use of emotions in the press 
coverage can be interpreted as part of the pre-legitmation and the subsequent ‘chain 
of legitimacy’ (Zappettini, forthcoming) that has sustained the critical juncture1 of 
Brexit (Zappettini & Krzyzanowski 2019) and normalised ‘harder’ forms of Brexit 
after the referendum. In other words, the alleged ‘humiliation’ of Britain can be 
seen as concatenated into the larger populist narrative that has portrayed the UK as 
vexed/ostracised by the EU resulting in Brexit being framed by the majority of 
tabloids as a heroic act of national pride and independence – or as ‘Britain freeing 
itself from the EU’s shackles’ (see Zappettini 2019). Such framing of Britain’s 
‘humiliation’, I argue, boosted already existing attitudes to Brexit that The Sun had 
been priming onto its readership through years of negative coverage of the EU/UK 
relationship and through narratives of victimisation of the UK by the Brussels and 
Westminster ‘elites’ (see Zappettini & Krzyzanowski 2019, Zappettini 2021).  
By providing a window on the language of Brexit in tabloids, the rationale for 
my analysis is to show that the media have been key actors in the UK’s departure 
from the EU for they have not simply acted as platforms reverberating and 
amplifying different political messages, but crucially because they have in fact 
pushed their own ideological agenda to legitimise and institutionalise specific 
populist imaginaries of Brexit leveraging on certain dominant logics and emotions 
(e.g. freedom, rupture, emancipation). The intended contribution of my analysis is 
therefore an understanding of the pragmatics of emotions at the intersection of 
consumption and production of media and political discourses (Wahl-Jorgensen 
2019). Here, therefore I take Brexit as a case study of emotive rather than emotional 
communication (Alba-Juez & Larina 2018) to highlight the conscious mobilisation 
of emotions for communicative purposes in which the newsworthiness of a piece is 
often driven by the newspaper’s very own political and commercial agenda.  
                                                            
1 Critical juncture refers to the process of institutionalization of specific social, political and 
cultural visions of reality sustained by the acceleration of a discursive path/trajectory (see Zappettini 
and Krzyzanowski, 2019). 
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The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Features of tabloid 
journalism and its role in Brexit are discussed in section 2 which also provides some 
background on the events covered in the news article analysed (reproduced in 
Appendix 1). The analytical approach is discussed in section 3 followed by a 
discussion of the findings in section 4 and conclusions in section 5.  
 
2. The discourse of tabloids and the critical juncture of Brexit 
Arguably, no country is characterized by its popular national press culture 
more than Britain is by its tabloids. In a country where people read more 
newspapers per head than any other nation and where five national tabloid titles 
reach around 85% of the entire readership (Bingham & Conboy, 2015) the role of 
the tabloid press can hardly be overestimated. The popular press has played a key 
role in how millions of British people have been informed about and made sense of 
the world around them, its social and political life. Significantly, over time, 
different titles have pushed different political agendas and heavily influenced and 
divided public opinion. This has increasingly been the case as newspapers have 
become industrial and commercial ventures and different tabloid titles were born to 
support and reflect different social attitudes and ideologies (Bingham and Conboy 
2015). Since Alfred Harmsworth initially launched The Daily Mail in 1896 on the 
model of right-wing populist Sunday newspapers and the American press Tabloid 
format (12’16’) other titles followed his successful formula, for example The 
Daily Express which was established in 1900. This was followed by a second wave 
emerging in the 1930s with Labour-supporting titles such as The Daily Herald and 
Daily Mirror. Finally, the 1970s saw the arrival of Murdoch’s The Sun which over 
the years has repeatedly swayed its political support between the Tories and Labour. 
Tabloid journalism constitutes a genre of its own vis-à-vis the so-called 
‘quality press’ being characterised by certain distinctive features. In ideological 
terms, tabloid journalism understands its own social role in opposition to the 
“excesses of political correctness and [..] liberal intellectualism” (Krämer 2018: 15) 
rather than the duty to promote an informed democratic dialogue among citizens. 
Tabloids typically use a discursive style aimed at creating newsworthiness around 
a mix of ‘soft’ content (e.g., celebrities and gossip), hard facts and opinions which 
often compress complex arguments into simplistic evaluations and catchy lines 
(Conboy 2004). Tabloids are prominently known for their demotic (or vernacular) 
discursive register characterised by highly emotive, sensational, and everyday 
language. This language is often found in headlines relying on puns, wordplay, 
rhyming and alliteration designed as forms of entertainment, humour and satire 
attuning to the folk culture of the intended readership. Different studies have 
highlighted the simplistic conceptual categories and colloquial, emotional, 
evaluative vocabulary (such as punks, nuts, perverts, bonkers, thugs) used by 
tabloids (Conboy 2004). Similarly, sensational language to maximise the story's 
newsworthiness (e.g. scandal, fury, outrage, secret, revealed, shocking, exclusive) 
has been prevalent in the tabloid press (Schaffer 1995). Tabloids’ evaluative 
Franco Zappettini. 2021. Russian Journal of Linguistics 25 (3). 645–662 
649 
language is also less nuanced compared to that of broadsheet – for example 
disagreements or debates will tend to be referred to as rows, fury, feuds while to 
criticise someone will be reported as to slam, lash, rap, lambast, etc. Two-word 
noun phrases are also used to represent/evaluate social actors (e.g., miracle baby 
survives plane crash; innocent bystanders witnessed the attack) while 
unconventional spelling is frequent for politicians’ names such as Jez for Jeremy 
Corbyn, Maggie for Margaret Thatcher and so on. Another conspicuous feature of 
the tabloid press has been the explicit ‘male gaze’ taken by these publications (for 
example The Sun is well known for publishing topless models on its page three) 
and, in general, the trivialisation and sexualisation of political issues (which 
dovetails with the ideological ‘politically incorrect’ approach of tabloid 
journalism). For example, a Daily Mail article (2014) on the newly formed 
Cameron cabinet focused on female MPs’ attire and the way they ‘cat walked’ into 
their first new cabinet meeting. Similarly, a Brexit meeting between English and 
Scottish Prime Ministers was headlined as a ‘Legxit’ or a legs beauty contest (Daily 
Mail 2017).  
The tabloid press has also historically fuelled acrimonious debates about nation 
and race typically promoting a nationalist agenda with, in some cases jingoistic and 
overtly xenophobic tones (Bingham & Conboy 2015). The legitimacy of nations 
has often been predicated on the discursive reproduction of the affective dimension 
of being part of an ‘imagined’ community (Anderson 2006) even if in ‘banal’ forms 
(Billig 1995). The tabloids’ direct interpellation of audiences as part of a national 
‘textual community’ promotes their identification as a group member but it also 
encourages readers to feel part of an us-group versus an antagonistic other-group 
if feelings are mobilised in such a way. For example, while Edwardian era tabloids 
reproduced narratives of ‘Britannia rules the waves’, hostility towards strangers 
subsequently shifted towards different ‘foreigners’, namely Irish and Jewish 
immigrants (‘Aliens’ in The Daily Express, 1901) and then the German ‘foes’ in 
World War 1and 2 (‘The Huns’, Daily Mail). The ‘50s and 60’s saw the tabloid 
press amplifying overtly discriminatory discourses against black people (Daily 
Express headlines in this period included ‘Would You Let Your Daughter Marry a 
Black Man?’; ‘800,000 People Who Shouldn’t Be Here’ and ‘Visitors Who Never 
Go Home’). The 1980s and 1990s saw tabloids engaging with different mainstream 
representations of Britain and its ‘enemies’. For example, the us versus them 
military propaganda was recurrent in The Sun’s coverage of the Falklands war (‘our 
lads’ for the British army) and the Afghanistan war (‘Prince Harry…one of our 
boys’) (see Richardson 2009). The last twenty years have seen the tabloids press 
engaged in a backlash against multiculturalism with distinct Islamophobic and 
Europhobic tones. In this context most tabloid titles have peddled negative frames 
of news on immigration, for example, through frequent metaphorical domains that 
have associated immigrants with natural disaster and animals (floods and swarms 
of people) and states with containers (‘Open door policy must be changed,  
Britain is full’).  
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Historically, a large section of the British tabloid press has also strongly 
opposed the EU’s political project and has portrayed UK/EU relationships 
negatively (Hardt-Mautner 1995). Titles such as The Sun have often represented the 
UK and the EU as opponents relying on metaphors of war (Daddow 2012). In the 
1980s The Sun encouraged readers to submit ‘anti-French jokes’ and in 1990 it 
published the infamous headline ‘Up yours Delors’ vilifying the then President of 
the European Commission for his French-centric vision of Europe. Other titles such 
as The Daily Mail and The Daily Express have often initiated various anti-EU 
‘crusades’ based on bogus ‘Euro-myths’ (e.g. ‘the EU wants to ban our kettles’) 
some of which the EU Commission has debunked through a dedicated website2. 
The mainstream discourse to which a large part of the tabloids’ readership has been 
relentlessly exposed for years has portrayed the UK as a victim of a Franco-German 
alliance or a Brussels ‘conspiracy plot’ (see also Levy et. al. 2016).  
There have been different explanations for why the tabloid press, and The Sun 
in particular, have taken their specific Eurosceptic (or indeed Europhobic) stance. 
It is reported that when The Evening Standard journalist Anthony Hilton asked 
Rupert Murdoch the reason why he was so opposed to the European Union he 
replied: “That’s easy. When I go into Downing Street they do what I say; when I 
go to Brussels they take no notice” (Hilton 2016). There are however further 
plausible motives for how nationalist sentiment has been mobilised against the EU 
and why the EU’s ‘ever closer Union’ project has been represented as incompatible 
with British interests escalating into calls for Brexit. Brexit can be read as a populist 
response driven by political opportunism leveraging both logics of 
acceleration/deceleration of globalisation patterns (Zappettini & Krzyżanowski 
2019). From a leftist ideological perspective, the argument of global deceleration 
rejected neoliberalism and austerity (with the EU seen as a key actor of global 
governance penalising power within national remits) while the right-wing side 
advocated a logic of global acceleration, that is further liberalisation and 
international free trade, portraying the EU as frustrating British ‘global’ mercantile 
aspirations (cf. Zappettini 2019a, 2019b). The tabloid press capitalised on both 
views advocating Brexit from the stance of trade frustrated by the EU’s red tape as 
well as from the stance of ‘working people’ left behind by the EU transnational 
neoliberal model (see Zappettini 2020). In relation to domestic politics, Brexit was 
also a discursive opportunity for England to re-imagine itself as a new powerful 
democracy in the wake of Scottish and Welsh devolution (Barnett 2018) and vis-a-
vis its imperial past. In this vein, O’ Toole (2018) argues that through the Brexit 
vote, the English directed their anger to the EU in order to reaffirm their glorious 
past and recreate a sense of groupness through ‘consensual’ humiliation that tapped 
into the national psyche of British exceptionalism (see also Cohen 2019). As 
evoking emotions of shame and humiliation helps one feel morally superior, by 
representing the struggle of ‘freeing’ itself from the EU’s yoke, Britain was trying 
to redeem itself from its imperial legacy in a reversal of the victim-perpetrator roles 
                                                            
2 https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/ECintheUK/curved-bananas/ (Accessed: 28.09.2018). 
Franco Zappettini. 2021. Russian Journal of Linguistics 25 (3). 645–662 
651 
(O’ Toole 2018). O’ Toole also points to a generalised interpretation of Brexit as 
an act of ‘heroism’ in relation to the narrative that Brexit would help Britain escape 
the EU’s doomed project (and equally save the EU from itself). Such a cautionary 
tale was often narrated by Leavers who metaphorically urged voters to embrace 
Brexit as the only way to abandon the EU’s ‘sinking ship’. The Titanic allegory 
became a powerful symbolic narrative of Britain saving itself from the catastrophic 
collision to which the direction of EU politics would lead and crucially to juxtapose 
Britain’s ‘heroic lifeboat’ vis-a-vis the EU’s hubris (Charteris Black 2019). This 
nationalist framing of Brexit news was particularly prevalent in the Sun’s titles for 
example in the front-page headline ‘Beleave in Britain’ (13/6/2016) urging to  
vote out and in the front-page headline hailing the referendum outcome as 
‘Independence Day’ (23/6/2016). Mobilising emotions around Brexit and 
portraying exiting the EU as the only way for the UK to ‘regain’ its sovereignty and 
dignity was certainly at the heart of the tabloids discourse during the Brexit 
referendum campaign. For example, an analysis of how the tabloid press covered 
the campaign (Zappettini 2021) found that “the vast majority of tabloids relied on 
discursive strategies that primarily appealed to emotions of fear, resentment and 
empowerment in an antagonistic framing of the British versus ‘other’ people. […] 
The framing of Brexit as an enactment of British pride was prominent and often 
adopted by a number of articles in relation to strategies that typically appealed to 
emotions of national resistance and standing up to the people’s opponents/bullies”. 
It is against this background that the analysis has focused on an article published by 
The Sun on 21 September 2018 titled ‘EU dirty rats’ (see Appendix 1) to show how 
such pre-legitimising narratives were taken up by tabloids during the period in 
which Brexit was institutionalised. The article is an opinion piece referring to events 
that occurred a few days beforehand in Salzburg of which the next section will 
provide some background.  
 
2.1. A contextualisation of the Salzburg meeting 
Following the 2016 referendum result to leave the EU and the trigger of Article 
50, the UK and the EU began their negotiations on their future relationship status. 
In July 2018, the then Prime Minister Theresa May laid out the Government’s plan 
for such a new UK/EU partnership in what became known as the Chequers proposal 
after the country estate where it was presented to the Cabinet. The Chequers 
proposal envisaged the UK sharing a common rulebook for maintaining 
‘frictionless’ free trade of goods and services with the EU but made no concessions 
on freedom of movement and foresaw no role for the European Court of Justice 
over UK laws. The proposal met with negative responses among EU leaders when 
it was presented to them at an informal summit in Salzburg in September 2018. 
French president Macron said the plan was ‘unacceptable’ because the UK was 
‘cherry picking’ the most favourable terms without accepting any obligations 
deriving from such a close association with the Union. He was also keen to signal 
EU unity in the face of the populist surge across Europe. The European Council 
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President Donald Tusk said May's plan would not work because it undermined the 
single market by giving British companies a competitive advantage. In short, the 
plan was dismissed as another ‘global Britain’ fantasy of ‘having its cake and eating 
it too’ (see Zappettini 2019, Musolff 2021, this issue) while PM May called for the 
EU to treat the UK with more respect in Brexit negotiations (BBC, 2018). ‘Ambush’ 
and ‘humiliation’ became prevalent terms of framing the above events in British 
public discourse, not only among politicians but also in news outlets including the 
quality press (Quinn 2020). The ’humiliation’ of Britain in Brexit negotiation was 
frequently evoked by the media and such representations were widely reproduced 
in public opinion. In a 2019 poll, 90% of Britons thought that Brexit negotiations 
had brought shame to the nation (although more people believed the blame lay with 
the British government’s handling of Brexit than the EU’s) (Sky News, 2019). 
Crucially, the Salzburg meeting took place a few weeks before the Conservative 
party annual conference and the Chequers meeting was meant to represent the PM’s 
attempt to quell hard Brexiteers within her party who would like to leave the EU 
with no deal while, at the same time, she was trying to compromise on softer Brexit 
positions including those which would favour a second referendum. The PM hoped 
that the Chequers plan would be a political opportunity to reconcile her divided 
party while strengthening her leadership. Part of the negative press coverage 
therefore had much to do with the PM’s domestic credibility and her leadership and 
in the quality press ‘humiliation’ primarily referred to the PM’s reputation within 
domestic rather than international politics (although the latter was also relevant for 
example to make the case for showing how Britain’s clout on the world stage had 
waned 3 ). The tabloid press, however, (as well as right-wing politicians 4 ) 
predominantly tended to frame the meeting outcome in terms of Britain itself being 
humiliated and the Prime Minister being ‘ambushed’ i.e. invited to the talks in 
Salzburg and led to believe that her plan would be agreed on only to be shunned by 
the EU leaders. 
 
3. Analytical approach 
While the analytical approach has adopted a general Critical Discursive 
orientation (Wodak & Fairclough 1997) it has in particular drawn from 
Communication Studies the well known concept of framing (Entman 1993, see also 
Solopova & Kushneruk, in this issue). Framing relates to how the news narrative 
defines events and issues (e.g., as problems, crises, etcetera) and how it links them 
to actors, causes and any suggested solutions. As Entman (1993: 52) points out, 
framing involves the selection of specific “aspects of a perceived reality to make 
                                                            
3 See https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-theresa-may-deal-suez-britain-eu-a8730 
746.html (Accessed: 23.09.2018). 
4  See, for example, Dominic Raab’s comment “We’ve been humiliated as a country” 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/14/brexit-britain-national-humiliation-uk-eu 
(Accessed: 14.06.2019). 
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them more salient in a communicating text”. Through framing, the speaker – in this 
case the journalist or editorial voice5  – is not only able to provide a specific 
perspective on certain objects of social reality but also to define the conceptual tools 
for reasoning about those objects and, crucially, to influence the audience’s 
interpretations and actions in relation to them. A frame can thus be understood in 
terms of language, images or their multimodal combination deployed to articulate 
a discourse as well as in terms of reasoning devices, that is the conceptual 
framework through which the issue is made sense of and evaluated. A frame can 
therefore provide the ethical ‘toolbox’ and drive moral reasoning on the issue, 
especially when frames consolidate into socially agreed perspectives that become 
the dominant interpretation or the conventional schema for the community that 
consumes and reproduces a particular discourse (Musolff 2016, Charteris Black 
2019). In this sense, ideologies can be propagated by the media to their audiences 
through the ‘cumulative effect’ (Bell 1996) of repeatedly used frames which 
normalise reality within a larger epistemic community such as a newspaper’s 
readership. Against this background, the in-depth analysis has zeroed in on 
linguistic devices through which framing was operated, in particular allegory 
(Charteris Black 2019), metaphors (Musolff 2016) as well as the discursive 
strategies (Wodak et al. 2009) through which moral reasoning around Brexit was 
articulated. Put succinctly, allegories are symbolic narrations aimed at conveying 
“some form of covert ethical comment that cautions the reader or listener indirectly 
on how to behave when faced with some form of moral question” (Charteris Black 
2019: 18). Allegorical narratives can thus be rhetorically used to frame events and 
actors around distinct ethical precepts and, crucially, to induce moral reasoning 
along distinct metaphorical scenarios. Musolff (2016) defines a metaphorical 
scenario as: “a set of assumptions […] about the prototypical elements of a concept, 
[…] ‘dramatic’ story lines and default outcomes, as well as ethical evaluation of 
these elements, which are connected to the social attitudes and emotional stances 
that are prevalent in the respective discourse community” (Musolff 2016: 30–31). 
Discursive strategies, on the other hand, are ‘intentional plan[s] of practices… 
adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal’ 
(Wodak et al. 2009: 94) and are predicated on implicit/explicit argumentative 
schemes. For example, Wodak et al. (2009) refer to the construction of national 
identity achieved, inter alia, through strategies of unification and differentiation 
predicated on arguments of comparison (see also Zappettini 2019c for a discussion 
of discursive strategies aimed at dismantling or delegitimising national identities). 
 
                                                            
5  See Goffman (1981) for a distinction between author, principal and animator and 
Dobrosklonskaya (2021, this issue) for a discussion of ‘news voices’. In this case the article analysed 
is anonymous and featured under the ‘The Sun says’ column which is where the newspaper 
traditionally has published its collectively authored editorial pieces. The Sun says ‘We can’t wait to 
free ourselves’ reproduces the newspaper’s explicit pro-Brexit agenda. 




The discourse in this article is conspicuously driven by the allegory of 
gangsterism and the metaphorical scenario of emancipation. The piece frames the 
Salzburg meeting as being played out by two opposed actors in a hyperbolic 
metaphorical scenario of gangster culture permeated by violence and abuse. As 
noted above, allegories have symbolic and rhetorical value and are produced to 
argue a particular moral stance. In this case, the key purpose of framing the UK/EU 
relation through the allegory of gangsterism is to characterise Britain as the story 
hero who after being unjustly ‘bullied’ it now resists and breaks free from its 
criminal antagonist via Brexit. The framing of actors relies on antithetical and 
antagonistic representations of us (the in-group) and them (the out-group) and of an 
unbalanced relationship between the two groups with distinct oppressor/villain and 
oppressed/hero roles for the EU and Britain, respectively. The out-group is framed 
as the oppressor through different semiotic characterisations. For example, the EU 
is metonymically caricatured as a ‘mobster’ pair made up of French Prime Minister 
Emmanuel Macron and the EU’s Council President Donald Tusk. In English, the 
lexeme mobster connotes someone who is involved in organized crime or belongs 
to a criminal gang and the term mob has also been used as a synonym for the mafia. 
Such linguistic characterisation is visually reinforced by the meme of the two 
politicians dressed as gangsters in pinstripe suites and holding guns and by the war 
metaphor ‘fear [is the EU’s] only weapon in their arsenal’. Consistent with the 
allegorical narration of gangsterism, the passage “Brussels has made us an offer it 
thinks we can’t refuse” is a clear intertextual reference to the popular film The 
Godfather (1972) where the sentence ‘an offer that can’t be refused’ is famously 
uttered by the protagonist, mafia boss Don Corleone played by Marlon Brando, to 
imply a mafia order. Brussels making Britain an offer it can't refuse is thus 
euphemistically used here to mean a threatening command that Britain must execute 
or else it will have to bear the consequences. The gangster culture scenario is 
reinforced in lines 25–26 where the EU is represented as an ‘outfit’ (a metonymy 
for gangsters) that ‘looks more at home in Sicily than Strasbourg'' the two 
geographical references conjuring up associations with the mafia and the EU 
Parliament, respectively. The crime allegory is further evoked by the headline ‘EU 
dirty rats’, a homophonic reference to gangster film, Taxi! (1932) in which actor 
James Cagney is believed to utter the iconic line “You dirty rat!” 6.  
Further considerations can be made on the us/them juxtaposition. While in the 
article third-person plural pronouns and adjectives (they/them/their) are exclusively 
attributed to the EU or its leaders to portray them as Britain’s arrogant bullies (‘they 
have refused to negotiate in good faith/ to compromise/ insulted the minister/ 
ignored their citizens’), the first-person plural pronouns and adjectives (we/us/our) 
                                                            
6 The exact line is “you dirty yellow-bellied rat" however in popular culture this has often been 
misquoted as “You dirty rat”.  
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are inferable as relating to the newspaper’s own editorial voice and that of its 
readership (‘we join the Prime Minister in saying no’, ‘our Brexit message’, ‘The 
Sun says we can’t wait to free ourselves’) as well as to the British nation and its 
institutions (‘to punish us’, ‘Brussels has made us an offer’, ‘we need to [prepare] 
for a clean-break Brexit’, ‘they want us to vote’). As noted in footnote 5 the article 
is anonymous and, as it is conventional with pieces under ‘The Sun says’ headline, 
can be attributed a collective authorship. In a symbiotic relationship between 
producer and consumer of text The Sun enacts the role of spokesperson for what 
can be seen as an ‘imagined’ textual/national community. The alignment between 
the newspaper and its readership is not only organised along ideological lines but 
also achieved through colloquial vocabulary resonating with a demotic style  
(e.g. ‘Fat chance of that”, ‘cackhanded’) and through satire (see below). 
 
4.2. Delegitimising the EU through moral reasoning and satire 
The main discursive strategies adopted in this article are the delegitimation of 
the EU – which is achieved leveraging on emotions of fear and via the allegory of 
gangsterism discussed above – and the logically consequential legitimation of 
Brexit as ‘breaking free’ from the oppressor in a heroic act of defiance and 
emancipation/empowerment. The delegitimation of the EU is operated not only 
through the argument that the Union is an undemocratic set up but also via the 
pervasive metaphor of ‘THE EU IS A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION’ which 
suggests precisely the ‘illegality’ of its actions and its intentions just as criminal 
gangs operate outside the law and are based on a culture of abuse and violence. 
Moreover, the crime metaphor is deployed to construct the scenario of ‘moral fight 
back’ via the argument that the EU have been ‘bullying’ the UK and thus to 
legitimise Brexit as Britain breaking free from such ‘racket’. This argument ties in 
with historical discourses of the alleged vexation and victimisation of the UK by 
Brussels that have been produced and circulated by The Sun well before Brexit and 
that were amplified during the referendum campaign (see Zappettini 2021). Such 
logical discursive continuity is reiterated in the passage ‘the European Union has 
shown time and time again why more than 17 million people voted to leave’  
(lines 18–19) which constitutes the causal link between the portrayal of the EU as 
Britain’s oppressor and Brexit as a popular response to it. We also notice the 
representation of Brexit as externally validated by other European citizens ‘where 
more and more voters are turning against [the EU]’ (lines 24–25). The article also 
delegitimises Macron and Tusk personas who are associated with the EU as a ‘two-
bit’ (i.e., worthless) mobster. Further negative representations of the two leaders are 
predicated on ascribing them immoral actions and arrogant characteristics (Donald 
Tusk ‘trolling the PM on Instagram’ and Macron’s ‘puffed up pomposity’. In a 
satirical vein (which is consistent with The Sun’s ‘tongue-in-cheek’ discursive 
style) the couple is also delegitimised as ‘inept gangsters’ via the analogy with 
Bugsy Malone, a popular musical comedy film about would-be gangsters (itself a 
parody of real-life gangsters Bugs Moran and Al Capone) and the statement ‘This 
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lot is more Bugsy Malone than Al Capone’ (line). Satire – which relies on the use 
of irony and exaggeration to ridicule public personas, especially politicians – can 
represent a form of delegitimation and is well established in British/Western 
cultures (see Ponton 2021, this issue; and Way 2021, this issue). By likening the 
two leaders to clumsy criminals the article not only delegitimises them but 
significantly it legitimises Britain’s fight back while downplaying emotions of fear 
and potential negative consequences from the act of liberation that Brexit would 
constitute. This reasoning is signalled by expressions such as: ‘we’ve got nothing 
to be scared of’ and ‘to show the EU [Britain] won’t roll over’ which mark Britain’s 
heroic role of standing up against the EU’s alleged threatening behaviour and the 
imagery of a ‘new future free of [the EU’s] cold, dead hands’ (line 33) which 
personifies the EU as a lifeless individual. Portraying the ‘humiliation’ of the Prime 
Minister as an undermining of collective pride and national dignity has further 
moral implications. Rather than an objective reality, the act of humiliating (that is 
to show someone’s inferiority) is intrinsically correlated to one's own perception of 
one’s own status. One country can therefore feel humiliated if its relationship with 
other countries is perceived as incompatible with its own imagined status on the 
world stage. In this case representations of humiliation rely on the implicit 
assumption that Britain carries more power than other EU countries and that that 
should be reflected in negotiations. Moreover, representations of Prime Minister 
being ambushed and mortified are predicated on the assumption of some intentional 
calculated attempts to treat her in such a malevolent way.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Approaching journalist discourse at the intersection of affective, stylistic, and 
political dimensions of communication, this paper has discussed how emotions 
were mobilised in the Brexit public debate via the example of The Sun’s coverage 
of the alleged UK’s ‘humiliation’ at the Salzburg meeting. It has been argued that 
the Sun made an instrumental use of emotive language and populist narratives by 
leveraging feelings of fear, pride, resistance, and freedom to portray Britain as a 
victim of the EU and to legitimise Brexit along the moral reasoning of ‘heroic 
emancipation from bullying’. The analysis highlighted how the overarching 
framing of events and actors in this article was predicated on the us vs them 
dichotomy and was narrated via the allegory of gangsterism and the metaphorical 
scenario of emancipation. The UK was characterised as the story hero who is 
morally entitled to break free from its criminal bullying antagonist via Brexit. The 
framing of the EU and Britain as the oppressor/ oppressed, respectively, was 
semiotically realised through the pervasive multimodal metaphor THE EU IS A 
CRIMINAL ORGANISATION, that portrays the EU as an illegal racket and its 
leaders at the same time threatening and inept, and via specific intertextual 
references tapping into the popular culture of mafia and gangster films. This 
framing served to dramatize the imagery of Britain held captive by the EU and to 
represent Brexit as an opportunity to stand up to the enemy and upend the status 
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quo. In addition, moral reasoning made use of satirical and colloquial registers 
designed to resonate with the intended audience. The analysis showed how The Sun 
performed the role of spokesperson for its reading community by tapping into the 
psychology of national emotions (collective feelings of groupness, shared identities 
and interests). In this sense The Sun’s framing of Brexit events and actors has been 
key in the discursive reproduction as an ‘imagined’ affective dimension of 
Britishness. Crucially, representations in this article concatenate into The Sun’s 
long-established portrayal of frustration at the power asymmetry between the UK 
and the EU and the UK’s victimisation by the Brussels and Westminster elites 
(Zappettini 2019). Eliciting such emotions was instrumental in pushing the 
newspaper anti-EU agenda and in delegitimising the EU as Britain’s oppressor it 
must free itself/acquire independence. Mobilising emotions of fear and pride was 
equally instrumental in legitimising and institutionalising ‘harder’ forms of Brexit 
(see Zappettini, forthcoming for a discussion of how the narrative of Britain’s 
enemies was framed in the tabloid press during the post-referendum debate).  
Emotional language and specific narratives may become common currency in 
the way we speak about certain actors and in how we understand certain affairs or 
processes and should invite us to consider the question of tabloid journalism and its 
role in making the UK press as “the least trusted in Europe” (European 
Broadcasting Unit 2017). Finally, as with all interpretive studies, the limitation 
must be acknowledged of analysing emotions in language through the lens of 
inferences made by the analyser. While the socio-political contextualisation and the 
literature have provided the background to the interpretation, the question of 
audience reception remains open and any study addressing emotions in the 
readership could help corroborate these findings. 
 
© Franco Zappettini, 2021 
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Body 
WE can’t wait to shake ourselves free of the two-bit mobsters who run the European Union. 
EU leaders promised a fair hearing on our future relationship at yesterday’s crunch Salzburg summit. 
Instead, Mrs May was ambushed with a cackhanded attempt to sign us up to Brussels’ unacceptable 
terms there and then. 
The PM refused to budge on the UK’s red lines, and she’s absolutely right to do so. This lot are 
more Bugsy Malone than Al Capone. 
Yesterday the leaders of the undemocratic European Union showed their true colours. 
This isn’t some grand project, designed to bring the peoples of Europe together in one happy union. 
It’s a protection racket. 
But even before the Prime Minister had been the subject of calculated attempts to humiliate her, we 
saw just how detached from reality Europe’s leaders have become. 
Maltese and Czech leaders told Britain to hold a second referendum, employing the same tactic that 
the EU has used in Ireland and Denmark before. 
This isn't based on the half-baked “democratic” argument clung to by never-were and past-it 
grandees at home, such as Andrew Adonis and Lord Heseltine. 
They just want us to be given the chance to vote the “right” way. 
Fat chance of that. Throughout this process, the European Union has shown time and time again 
why more than 17 million people voted to leave. 
They have refused to negotiate in good faith. They have refused to compromise, even while Britain 
has worked day-in, day-out to find agreement. 
They have insulted the Prime Minister, ignored their own citizens, and are willing to accept a 
massive economic hit for the sake of flexing their muscles. 
Like all good gangsters, they’re trying to rule by fear. That’s the only weapon in their arsenal on the 
Continent, where more and more voters are turning against an outfit that increasingly looks more at 
home in Sicily than Strasbourg. 
All they have is the chance to punish us, and prove to the rest of the continent that it isn’t worth 
leaving. 
The message they want to send? You won’t get away with it. 
Well, Mrs May is right to say that we’ve nothing to be scared of. 
Yes, it is without doubt that we need to pick up the pace on preparations for a clean-break Brexit. It 
is vital we show the European Union, who still seem to think we’ll roll over when it really matters, 
that we are ready for a new future free of their cold, dead hands. 
And despite no-marks such as Donald Tusk trolling the PM on Instagram, and the puffed-up 
pomposity of France’s Emmanuel Macron and Ireland’s Leo Varadkar, we haven’t entirely given 
up hope that sensible forces within the EU might find their voice in the crucial months to come – 
and work with the UK, not against it. 
The Government should be all ears if Brussels makes us an offer that works for both sides. 
But after yesterday’s performance, we don’t hold out much hope. 
Brussels has made us an offer it thinks we can’t refuse. 
Today we join the Prime Minister in saying no. 
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